Abstract:  How do political elites respond when large segments of their electorate leave? In many developing countries, internal migration is a defining feature of household risk diversification and economic mobility. Yet, the political consequences of these demographic flows for origin communities remain poorly understood. This paper argues that migration undermines public goods provision in left-behind areas by weakening the electoral incentives of local politicians. Drawing on Hirschman’s exit-voice theory, I contend that when households rely on migration rather than political engagement to fulfill their welfare needs, elected officials face fewer pressures to perform, reducing their incentive to deliver services to those who remain. I test this argument in India, a country that is home to an estimated 100 million internal economic migrants. Using village-level panel data from India's Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS), I show that villages experiencing higher out-migration flows due to adverse shocks experience significant declines in public goods provision and in the institutional performance of gram sabhas, India's grassroots deliberative assemblies. Qualitative evidence from focus groups in a high-migration corridor reveals two plausible mechanisms. First,  remittances enable communities to purchase private substitutes for public services, undercutting incentives for local politicians to supply them. Second, and more distinctively, the selective outflow of younger and educated individuals drains villages of their political entrepreneurs, the actors who would otherwise mobilize communities, lobby elected officials, and coordinate collective action. In their absence, communities struggle to voice their demands and hold elected representatives accountable. These findings have implications for democratic governance beyond South Asia and demonstrate that emigration not only reshapes citizen political behavior, but also alters elite incentives to govern.